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A Search for Continuity in American Thought: 
From Benjamin Franklin to William James 
to Postmodernism 
Samuel Jaeckel 
Any search for continuity in American thought presupposes 
causality in intellectual history. That is, ideas are not generated in a 
vacuum; rather, ideas develop from other ideas to form a 
continuous pattern of cause and effect. As a result, one dimension 
of intellectual history is concerned with how these developing 
ideas fit together. John Higham writes: "Let us say, then, that 
intellectual history is first of all a branch of history, one variety of a 
species, sharing the general characteristics that distinguish 
historical knowledge. As such, it has an overriding concern with 
how and why particular human experiences have followed one 
another through time."1 
The first overriding concern of this essay is to isolate and 
examine the thread of continuity stretching between the particular 
human experiences of Benjamin Franklin and William James. 
Despite being separated by over 100 years, Franklin, in his 
Autobiography, and James, in Pragmatism, share certain 
philosophical commonalities that suggest the cause and effect 
pattern that characterizes intellectual history. By showing how 
Franklin's philosophy can be analyzed through the prism of James' 
pragmatism, we can see that a thread of continuity links various 
tenets of the two philosophies. Namely, both Franklin and James' 
philosophies ( 1 ) mediate between science and religion (or 
empiricism and rationalism); (2) must be defined, of course, as 
pragmatic; (3) demonstrate a distrust of abstraction and 
metaphysical dogmatism, (4) can be characterized by their 
changing nature; and (5) are distinguished by their future-oriented 
approach. 
The second concern, then, is to trace the trajectory of that thread 
of continuity as it stretches beyond James straight into the 
operative philosophy of today: postmodernism. A thread of 
continuity links postmodernism and James on three specific fronts: 
First, James exemplifies an extreme pessimism in purely objective 
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truth. Second, James emphasizes the role human perspective plays 
in asserting truth claims, thus anticipating postmodern 
perspectivalism. Third, as a consequence of points one and two, 
James reposes hope in the facility of genuine conversation between 
different interpretive communities, a hope shared by many 
postmodernists today. By tracing this thread of continuity between 
James and postmodernism, and by methods of association, we are 
confronted with the extraordinary question: Is Benjamin Franklin, 
in some miraculous sense, postmodern? Although clearly 
outlandish, this question is more tenable if phrased more modestly: 
Do some of the tenets of postmodernism exist in embryonic form in 
Franklin's philosophy? Phrased this way, this question might 
enable us to trace a thread of continuity in American thought that 
spans nearly two centuries. 
According to Bruce Kuklich, a major theme "running through 
James's writing is the attempt to link the facts of nature and spirit, 
of science and religion."2 "Indeed," Kuklich goes on to write, "it is 
the crucial element in pragmatic philosophy." Throughout 
Pragmatism, James attempts to negotiate between science, or 
empiricism, on the one hand, and religion, or rationalism, on the 
other. In fact, the tension produced from this dialectic fuels much of 
the motivation of James' text and serves to mold pragmatism into a 
systematic philosophy. The empiricist, according to James, is the 
"lover of facts in all their crude variety .... "3 The rationalist, on the· 
other hand, is the "devotee to abstract and eternal principles." 
Charting the middle way between empiricism and rationalism, 
James proposes his philosophy of pragmatism: "It is at this point 
that my own solution begins to appear. I offer the oddly-named 
thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of 
demand. It can remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the 
same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy 
with facts." 4 
The fact that Franklin attempts to do something very similar 
to this- to meld rationalism with empiricism, religion with 
science- is evidenced in Franklin's reflections on his invention of 
the wood stove. This invention was the product of an entirely 
empirical process; to use James' terminology, Franklin, "the lover 
of facts," invented the wood stove. However, Franklin also had 
rationalist, or religious, blood running through his veins. Thus, 
Franklin reflects upon the possibility of approaching religion 
empirically. Donald H. Meyer puts it this way: 
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One could quickly see the advantages of his new wood stove, 
Franklin had announced in 1744, by investigating the matter 
for oneself, coming to understand the 'Properties' and the 
'Principles' involved, examining them 'separately and 
particularly,' then make the necessary 'comparisons.' Why 
cannot something similar be done in the realm of faith ?5 
This question proposes a marriage between science (empiricism, 
experimentation, etc.) and faith or rationalism. Not unlike James, 
Franklin seems to be negotiating between the extremes. Like James, 
Franklin sees validity in both science and faith, empiricism and 
rationalism. Thus, James and Franklin approach epistemology from 
a very similar angle that enables them to remain receptive to the 
divergent truth claims of empiricism and rationalism. 
For James, such receptivity to these divergent truth claims clears 
the philosophical road for pragmatism. By proceeding hand in 
hand with both empiricism and rationalism, pragmatism is enabled 
to avoid the pitfalls inherent in each. If monolithic, empiricism, 
James realizes, will ask questions solely on matters of fact. On the 
other hand, rationalism, if monolithic, will ask questions solely on 
first principles and theoretical constructs. By blending these two 
questions, 'pragmatic interrogations emerge. James writes: 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. 
'Grant an idea or belief to be true,' it says, 'what concrete 
difference will its being true make in any one's actual life? 
How will truth be realized? What experiences will be different 
from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, 
in short, is the truth's case-value in experiential terms?6 
Unlike rationalism, pragmatism does not rule out many empirical 
truth claims a priori. And unlike empiricism, pragmatism does not 
rule out many rational truth claims a priori. Consequently, since 
neither rationalism nor empiricism can become monolithic, the 
fundamental criteria for philosophical legitimacy is a truth claim's 
utility or consequential benefits. In a uniquely pragmatic move, 
both rationalism and empiricism are allowed into the court of 
arbitration if they, as Jacques Barzun writes, correspond to the 
"fitness of further experiences" - that is, if they produce tangible, 
harmonious experiential benefits.7 Thus, in the pragmatic 
paradigm, rationalism and empiricism are given assent if they 
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produce positive quantifiable results. Any truth claim, whether I 
rationalistic or empirical, is deemed "true" if it is successful on this z 
score. As James writes: "The truth is the name of whatever proves c 
itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, 1 
assignable reasons."8 
The thread of continuity between Franklin and James becomes 
more pronounced when we analyze how Franklin, mediating 
between science and religion, evaluates truth claims based upon 
James' "assignable reasons." Utilitarian value adjudicates between 
the claims of science and religion when Franklin evaluates the 
theology of his day. As with James, Franklin assigns a value to 
pragmatism that supersedes the status of empirical or rational 
"truth." Thus, also like James, Franklin gives the nod to measurable 
consequences when evaluating religious concerns and their 
implications. Writing of Franklin's theological beliefs, Donald H. 
Meyer comments: "When the teachings of a sect go beyond the 
'truths' we all 'know' they become matters of 'speculation,' and, as 
such, are to be handled not on the basis of truth or falsity but of 
social utility or worthlessness, perhaps mischief."9 For Franklin, 
then, the criteria of social utility (or worthlessness) hold primacy 
over any speculative theological truth status (be it empirical or 
rational). 
James exemplifies this same evaluation of speculative theology. 
Any estimation of a theological claim at the level of speculation 
must be conducted in terms of utility. James seems to echo Franklin 
when he writes: "The notion of God ... , however inferior it may be 
in clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical 
philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that it 
guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved."10 
Like Franklin, James favors any theological construct that 
perpetuates social order. Consequently, Franklin implicitly and 
James explicitly expound a new category of truth that transcends 
the limitations of strict empiricism and rationalism while, at the 
same time, not dismissing empiricism and rationalism from the 
court of appeal. James evidences this new category of truth when 
he writes: "If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete 
life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good 
for so much."11 Franklin aligns his beliefs within this same category 
of truth when he contemplates the theological idea of the divinity 
of Jesus Christ. Franklin writes that he will accept this belief "if that 
Belief has the good Consequence, as probably it has, of making his 
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Doctrines more respected and better observed ... " [emphasis 
added].12 Alfred Owen Aldridge perhaps best illustrates the thread 
of continuity linking Franklin and James when he describes 
Franklin using James' terminology: "But on the surface Franklin 
was a pragmatist, advocating beliefs and practices because of their 
salutary effect upon society."13 
Closely related to Franklin and James' pragmatism is a 
pronounced distrust of metaphysical abstraction. Such abstraction 
tends toward empty rhetoric and casuistry, which bears little 
relevance to the practical concerns of pragmatism. James, for 
instance, insists that philosophy is not just abstraction, but, he 
writes, a "positive connection in life."14 A pragmatist, James asserts, 
"turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed 
systems, and pretended absolutes and origins."15 James' discussion 
of the one and the many illustrates this turning away. He writes: 
'The world is One!'- the formula may become a sort of 
number-worship. 'Three' and 'seven' have, it is true, been 
reckoned sacred numbers, but, abstractly taken, why is 'one' 
more excellent than 'forty-three,' or than 'two million and 
ten'? In this first vague conviction of the world's unity, there 
is so little to take hold of that we hardly know what we mean 
by it.16 
Full of sound and fury, "number-worship" and convictions of 
the world's unity signify nothing. For James, these concepts are 
nothing more than philosophical fodder for high-brow sophists. 
More importantly, these concepts contribute little to the pragmatic 
emphasis on measurable, positive, experiential and societal 
consequences. 
Franklin's aversion to abstraction follows along James' lines. 
Franklin resists abstraction in order to concentrate on verifiable 
results. In the Autobiography, Franklin discusses his intention of 
writing an essay entitled "The Art of Virtue": "In this Piece it was 
my Design to explain and enforce this Doctrine, that vicious 
Actions are not hurtful because they are forbidden, but forbidden 
because they are hurtful, the Nature of Man alone consider' d .... "17 
Here, Franklin implies his resistance to discussing ethics in terms of 
abstract ontology. The belief that the forbiddenness of actions 
precede their viciousness can only be the subject of abstract debate. 
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What is concrete and knowable is the fact that vicious actions are 
hurtful. Like James and his attitude toward "number-worship" and 
the world's unity, Franklin sees no pragmatic merit in 
philosophizing on the ontological status of ethics. Franklin asserts 
that he is considering the "Nature of Man" alone; and such 
considerations are not merely abstract, but concrete and 
experientially quantifiable. 
Concomitant to their distrust of abstraction, Franklin and James 
censure dogmatism insofar as it thwarts pragmatism. A stubborn, 
dogmatic position on any singular issue discourages the elasticity 
that provides pragmatism with much of its efficacy. Pragmatism 
rarely reposes confidence in an absolute, binding truth claim. For 
this reason, James disapproves of dogmatic rationalism. He writes: 
"To treat abstract principles as finalities, before which our intellects 
may come to rest in a state of admiring contemplation is the great 
rationalist failing." 18 In a similar manner, Franklin disapproves of 
such finalities when he prescribes for himself the proper conduct 
toward his fellow citizens. He states: "I made it a Rule to forbear all 
direct Contradiction to the sentiments of others, and all positive 
Assertion of my own. I even forbid myself agreeable to the old 
Laws of our Junto, the Use of every Word or Expression in the 
Language that imported afix'd Opinion ... " [emphasis added].19 
Thus, we might better understand how Franklin's aversion to 
dogmatic fixed opinions draws him to a particular Presbyterian 
preacher described in the Autobiography. Franklin writes: " ... I 
became one of his constant Hearers, his Sermons pleasing me as 
they had little of the dogmatical kind, but inculcated strongly the 
practice of virtue ... " [emphasis added].20 Perhaps Alfred Owen 
Aldridge speaks for both Franklin and James when he asserts that 
Franklin opposed "intellectual authoritarianism" and distrusted 
"metaphysical dogmatism."21 For James and Franklin, if the desired 
end is utility and practical consequences, then the means must 
adapt and self-correct itself to reach those ends. Dogmatism 
presents an obstacle to this process. 
If Franklin and James distrust such dogmatism, and if 
dogmatism implies static truths, then it naturally follows that their 
own philosophies will both espouse a quality of an opposite cast. 
Thus, yet another thread of continuity links Franklin and James in 
that both of their philosophies are characterized by their changing 
character. As stated above, if the desired end is utility and practical 
consequence, then the means must adapt and self-correct itself to 
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reach those ends. It is clear that both Franklin and James are willing 
to change their position on an issue and assign and reassign the 
status of truth to these changing positions accordingly. 
The changing character of James' philosophy becomes clear 
when James articulates the nature of truth. Again, James is 
searching for practical, beneficial consequences, and if a 
proposition fulfills these conditions, such a proposition is deemed 
true. James writes: "A new opinion counts as 'true' just in 
proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the 
novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock ... . "n In other words, 
truth changes as new opinions harmonize with experience in a 
continually ongoing process that seeks to actualize a positive 
future. John Roth describes this Jamesian process as "continual 
revision": "Our awareness of future expectations is not exhaustive, 
is subject to error, and needs continual revision." 23 This revision, 
this changeability, enables James to remain flexible as he steers 
toward his elusive goal of practical consequences. 
Since Franklin's Autobiography is, to a large extent, episodic, 
perhaps a good way to illustrate the changing nature of Franklin's 
philosophy is to recount an episode that exemplifies this 
changeability. During his voyage to Philadelphia, Franklin resolves 
to become a vegetarian. Franklin demonstrates that this decision 
was not whimsical or arbitrary, but, instead, tended toward the 
philosophical, when he adopts this tenet into a sect (complete with 
doctrines and sermons) that he establishes with Samuel Keimer.24 
Although Franklin's vegetarian convictions remain firm for a while, 
the changing nature of his philosophy bears sway when he is 
confronted with a plate of cod. This fish being his weakness, 
Franklin rationalizes that since the cod eats smaller fish, he, 
consequently, should have no objections to eating the cod. He 
changes, or, in this case, makes an exception to, one tenet of his 
philosophy. Throughout the Autobiography, Franklin's 
philosophical as well as religious beliefs are subject to such 
modifications. For this reason, Donald H. Meyer writes that, for 
Franklin, "Institutions, including religious ones, were the 
machinery that ran society. They were to be studied, used, repaired 
when necessary, redesigned, even junked when the circumstances 
demanded it."25 Considered in the light of this sentence, the cod 
incident perhaps serves as a microcosm of the changeable nature of 
Franklin's philosophy as a whole. In fact, Franklin changed his 
theological position so many times that many religious 
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denominations of his day claimed him as their own. John Adams, 
the second President of the United States, writes: "The Catholics 
thought him almost a Catholic. The Church of England claimed 
him as one of them. The Presbyterians thought him half a 
Presbyterian, and the Friends believed him a wet Quaker." 26 
Although the notion of change can often carry pejorative 
connotations, forming images of instability or relativism in the 
mind, Franklin and James concentrate their energies on the hopeful 
possibilities of change. As a result of his many inventions, political 
tracts and negotiations, military expeditions, and diplomacy 
missions, Franklin transformed the course of America by 
incorporating the concept of change into its vocabulary. Over 100 
years before James, Franklin adapted a version of pragmatism that 
became a modus operandi for American success. Kenneth Silverman 
states that Franklin "incarnated the profoundly American belief 
that things can be changed."27 This profoundly American belief, of 
course, informs James' pragmatism as well. John M. Russell 
summarizes the fundamental role change plays as well as the 
potential opportunities it provides when he writes, "Change, in a 
word, best characterizes reality. Yet our efforts can hasten this 
changing, unfinished world toward a more fulfilling destiny. 
According to James, the meaning of our lives involves this very 
possibility." 28 
Change and its possibilities in creating a fulfilling destiny bring 
us to the final thread of continuity linking Franklin and James that I 
shall analyze. Since the consequences of the future are contingent 
upon the changes made in the present, Franklin and James' 
philosophies are future-oriented . That is, James and Franklin 
consider the possibilities of change always with an eye to the 
future. Future possibilities indelibly color their judgments. This is 
why James writes that "pragmatism shifts the emphasis and looks 
forward into facts themselves. The really vital question for us all is, 
What is this world going to be? What is life eventually to make of 
itself" [emphasis added]?29 Jacques Barzun asserts that such 
forward-looking questions naturally direct the mind to pragmatic 
thinking. He writes: "When the natural purposiveness of the stream 
of mind is directed rationally for making sure that an idea is right, 
the search is 'pragmatic' in the sense that it looks chiefly to what 
follows, not backwards to precedent or sideways to an 'original' " 
[emphasis added].30 Franklin evidences this looking-at-what-
follows mentality perhaps most poignantly in his essay, "The 
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Morals of Chess." He contends that the first lesson learned from 
chess is foresight, which, as he writes, "looks a little into futurity 
and considers the consequences that may attend an action ... . "31 
This lesson of foresight factors into nearly every facet of Franklin's 
accomplishments. Indeed, Franklin's life could serve as the 
metaphorical text for such a lesson. Thus, like the cod episode 
described above, the lesson of foresight derived from chess playing 
forms a sort of microcosm of Franklin as thinker - in this case, a 
microcosm of Franklin's future-oriented approach to philosophy. 
These, then, are just five of the threads of continuity that link 
Franklin and James. We might also notice how these five threads 
continually interweave. For example, Franklin and James' 
mediation between science and religion (or empiricism and 
rationalism) gives pragmatism its unique character; pragmatism, in 
turn, in the thought of Franklin and James, depends upon such 
mediation. Moreover, pragmatism naturally spawns a distrust of 
abstraction and metaphysical dogmatism. The changing character 
of Franklin and James' thought, consequently, is contingent upon 
such distrust. And, to complete this interweaving process, this 
changing variety of philosophy forces a future-oriented approach 
to philosophy. All this goes to say that the interweaving of threads 
serves to strengthen the intellectual ties that link Franklin and 
James, namely because these interweaving threads are of such a 
similar pattern. Thus, in terms of intellectual history, these threads 
supply the evidence that suggests a continuity in American thought 
spanning over a century. 
As mentioned at the outset of this essay, however, this thread of 
continuity, originating in the thought of Franklin, does not 
terminate with the philosophy of James. If we follow its trajectory 
beyond James, we can see that it reattaches itself to central tenets of 
postmodernism. This is a remarkable phenomenon when we 
consider the great epistemological divide that separates modernism 
(a heading under which we must include both Franklin and James) 
and postmodernism. I refer here to modernism not as a literary 
phenomenon but as an epistemological phenomenon. Modernism, 
as I am using the term is synonymous with Enlightenment 
foundation, which finds its origin in Rene Descartes. Stretching 
over such a g~ping divide, the thread of continuity is certainly in a 
precarious position. On the postmodern side of the great 
epistemological divide lies truth claims (or, perhaps better put, the 
absence of truth claims) radically different from any modernist 
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claim. Nancey Murphy addresses the enormous shift in thinking n 
which characterizes postmodernism when she writes: "I often point a 
out to students that they are privileged to live in an unusual and E 
exciting period in intellectual history. Changes as sweeping as P 
those now occurring in the intellectual world happen only rarely- tl 
perhaps the most recent such change was 300 years ago, although tl 
we need more historical perspective to make sound judgments r 
here."32 Before exploring how the thread of continuity connects u 
James and the "unusual and exciting" period of postmodernism, a u 
brief explanation of postmodern philosophy is in order. Such a 
description must begin with postmodernism's favorite villain, Rene d 
Descartes. iJ 
In 1637, Rene Descartes ushered in the period known as the t: 
Enlightenment with the publication of his Discourse on Method. F 
Employing mathematical methods and universal doubt, he sought l 
to break down knowledge and experience to indubitable u 
certainties. The rationalist/ foundationalist approach was highly s 
optimistic because it held that truth was "out there" and merely s 
needed to be "discovered." Descartes wrote:" ... there is only one r 
truth to each thing, whoever finds it knows as much about the f 
thing as there is to be known .... "33 The one truth that Descartes q 
claimed he knew for certain is expressed in the celebrated phrase, f 
"cogito ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am."34 The searcl1 for truth, I 
Descartes maintained, could be built upon this certain and { 
unshakable foundation; the search was furthermore undergirded c 
by the belief that truth was stable and knowable. I 
Late twentieth-century thinkers turned the Enlightenment on its ' 
head when they questioned the very starting point of Descartes' 
methodology. Descartes claimed to assume nothing when he began 
his inquiry. Careful to avoid any a priori deductions, inductions, or 1 
assumptions, Descartes attempted to divest himself of all 
interpreted data to reach an unquestionable epistemological 
foundation. But as William Placher writes, uninterpreted data are c 
never truly uninterpreted; inquiries are never conducted without t 
assumptions; and foundationalism is never truly foundational: I 
"Only in the context of assuming some things can he question other 
things . . . We cannot build knowledge on a foundation of 
uninterpreted sense-data, because we cannot know particular 
sense-data in isolation from the conceptual schemes we use to 
organize them" [emphasis in original].35 Those "conceptual 
schemes" may include the language with which knowledge is 
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made communicable, the society or culture of which the inquirer is 
nt a member, or the historical time period in which the inquirer lives.36 
Epistemological starting points, in other words, cannot be objective. 
All observations, as Placher writes, are "theory-laden."37 The result, 
then, of postmodern/post-Enlightenment thinking is the belief that 
there exists no universal standard by which we may judge 
rationality and truth-no Archimedean point of reference. Any 
understanding of the world is necessarily a contextualized 
understanding. 
The move from the deconstruction of rationalism to the 
1e deconstruction of empiricism and the scientific method was 
inevitable. Just as the postmodern rejects Cartesian rationalism on 
the basis of its claim to objective starting points of inquiry, so the 
postmodern rejects John Locke's empiricism for similar reasons. 
The postmodern denial of universal standards of criteria 
undermines the empiricist's search for definite fact via immediate 
sense-experience. Likewise, the long-cherished objective nature of 
science and the scientific method, the postmodern claims, is a 
misnomer. The findings of science do not represent a linear 
progression toward truth or the way things "really are"; rather, 
they answer the questions, framed by assumptions, asked by 
particular scientists of a particular time. Stanley Grenz writes that 
Einstein's general theory of relativity, Werner Heisenberg's 
Uncertainty Principle, and Louis de Broglie's Quantam theory all 
contribute to undermine the certitude reposed in the 
Enlightenment project and its appeal to the scientific method. He 
:s writes "According to the new understanding, scientific knowledge 
is not a compilation of objective universal truths but a collection of 
ln research traditions borne by particular communities of inquirers."38 
r Thus, scientific truth claims cannot be divorced from the scientist 
who made them, empirical truth claims cannot be divorced from 
the empiricist who made them, and rational truth claims cannot be 
divorced from the rationalist who made them. In addition, to claim 
that anything is scientifically, empirically, or rationally true is an 
Enlightenment/modem move that the postmodern would reject 
categorically. As Stephen T. Davis writes, in postmodernism, 
"There is no such thing as objectivity; everybody approaches reality 
with certain commitments and interests."39 Truth claims, as 
mentioned previously, are simply answers to questions framed by 
assumptions. Perhaps we can summarize the postmodern position 
in the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer: "I believe one can say in 
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principle: There can be no proposition that is purely and simply p 
true."40 a 
As stated at the outset of this essay, James' philosophy merges d 
with postmodernism on three fundamental issues. First, concurring u 
with the most basic assumption of postmodernism, James exhibits a d 
skepticism concerning purely objective truth- truth of a Cartesian tE 
flavor. This skepticism derives from a distinctly postmodern c. 
understanding of the contextual nature of knowledge described p 
above. James implicitly rejects Descartes by suggesting that there tl 
exists no privileged, objective point of reference (to use my p 
previous phrase, no Archimedean point of reference) from which to r' 
judge philosophical claims. Like the postmodernist, then, James tl 
hints at the inevitability of contextualized understandings of the v 
world. At the beginning of Pragmatism, for example, James e 
indicates that a philosopher's temperament necessarily influences a 
and colors his or her judgment. James, therefore, casts off any p 
pretension to neutrality. He writes: o 
.. . of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, 
he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his 
temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized 
reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his 
conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger 
bias than any of his more strictly objective premises.41 
Thus, the far-reaching influence of temperament precludes the 
possibility of objective premises and, consequently, objective 
conclusions as well. This all goes to say, then, that the concept of 
objective truth itself is questionable. James corroborates this in so 
many words when he writes: "The whole notion of truth, which 
naturally and without reflection we assume to mean the simple 
duplication by the mind of a ready-made and given reality, proves 
hard to understand clearly."42 This sentence could very well be 
inserted into any primer on postmodernism; it delineates 
postmodernism's primary tenet. In fact, John Roth's explanation of 
James' concept of truth could very well pass for a descriptive 
comment on postmodernism. He writes: "Truth is not something 
absolute and fixed-to think so is moving to the level of 
unwarranted abstraction."43 
Closely related to James' pessimism of objective trl{th is his 
uncanny, even eerie, anticipation of that dimension of: 
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postmodernism known as perspectivalism. This, then, is yet 
another thread that connects James to postmodernism. Harold Heie 
defines perspectivalism as "the view that our claims to knowledge 
g unavoidably reflect our particular perspectives as members of 
a different interpretative communities."44 Thus, not only can the 
n temperament of a philosopher affect his or her judgments, but so 
can the perspective from which he or she judges as well. James 
provides perhaps his most explicit assent to perspectivalism (even 
though it had not yet at the time been developed into a specifically 
philosophical construct) when he writes: "What we say about 
to reality thus depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The 
that of it is its own, but the what depends on the which; and the 
which depends on us" [italics in original].45 James provides an 
example of this phenomenon by pointing to mathematics. He 
asserts: "You can take the number 27 as the cube of 3, or as the 
product of 3 and 9, or as 29 plus 1, or 100 minus 73, or in countless 
other ways, of which one will be just as true as another" [emphasis 
in original].46 What is true, then, depends upon perspective. 
Philosophical judgments hinge upon perspective. James develops 
this idea in Pragmatism; postmodernists laud it as the first step in 
doing successful philosophy. 
For James and postmodernists, however, perspectivalism 
indicates that something more than clever mathematical concepts is 
at stake. One might extrapolate from James' mathematical example 
to the much more radical claim that all of intellectual history is 
contingent upon perspective. Again, contrary to Descartes, one 
perspective need not be more true than any other perspective, just 
as 9 times 3 is not any more true than 31 minus 4. Instead, one 
perspective may be more useful given the intellectual, scientific, or 
societal context of a given community.47 James employs this 
postmodern concept of perspective when he discusses scientific 
s advancement. He writes: 
The Laws [of science] themselves, moreover, have grown so 
f numerous that there is no counting them, and so many rival 
formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that 
investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no 
theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of 
them may from some point of view be useful.48 
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In this regard, James seems to anticipate Thomas Kuhn, who in tc 
turn greatly influenced many postmodernists. Kuhn calls the P' 
changing of "transcripts of reality" that have transpired over the 
centuries "paradigm shifts." No paradigm is inherently superior to p1 
another; rather, each paradigm affords a more useful point of view FJ 
for that community. Changing scientific theories, Kuhn contends, lo 
represent" .. . neither a decline nor a raising of standards, but a< 
simply a change demanded by the adoption of a new paradigm."49 ir] 
Thus, we can see how James explores a concept of perspectivalism a< 
that would later become the primary lens through which Kuhn and te 
postmodernists visualize intellectual history. ol 
A third commonality linking James and postmodernism tt 
emerges naturally from perspectivalism and represents what OJ 
postmodernists believe to be the hopeful possibility of p 
postmodernism in action: genuine conversation. As a consequence A 
of modern/Enlightenment thought, certain interpretative sc 
communities were excluded from the philosophical court of tv 
arbitration due to their supposed empirical or rational inferiority. 
Such communities were simply left out of the conversation. As a E; 
result of perspectivalism, however, no community can be excluded. ol 
Again, no perspective is superior (at least on broadly empirical or F1 
rational grounds) to another; the categories of epistemological p 
legitimacy have shifted dramatically. In postmodernism, then, and tr 
as a result of perspectivalism, conversation is paramount. Wendy p 
MacCredie states: "[Perspectivalism] is a view that recognizes tt 
difference and affirms it. Just because we have different views does SJ 
not mean we cannot talk to each other" [emphasis added].50 Thus, 
postmodernism emphasizes an open line of conversation. tc 
The importance of open conversation and free inquiry governs 
much of Pragmatism. Since (as I stated earlier) the possibility of 
conversation emerges naturally from perspectivalism, and since 
James adopts a strong form of perspectivalism, we can easily 
deduce the importance of conversation in James' philosophy. In 
line with the essence of postmodern conversation, James does not 
rule out any proposition a priori. Every proposition, in other words, 
deserves a hearing. James writes: "On pragmatic principles, we 
cannot reject any hypothesis if consequences useful to life flow T 
from it."51 Similarly, John Roth states that, in pragmatism, eJ 
" ... attempts to determine meaning need to be free, open, ~ 
descriptive, and nonreductive."52 Thus, it is evident that the h 
method of pragmatism and the method of postmodernism merge a· 
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to form yet a third thread of continuity between James and the 
postmodernists. 
Since these threads of continuity connect James and 
0 postmodernism, and since numerous other threads link James and 
1/ Franklin, we can now address ourselves to the startling, though 
logical conclusion that a continuity of thought spans from Franklin, 
across approximately two centuries of intellectual history, straight 
9 into postmodernism. We must qualify this conclusion, however, by 
1 adding that the connection between Franklin and postmodernism is 
1d tentative, perhaps even sketchy and tenuous at times. But a thread 
of continuity between the two is clearly visible if we analyze the 
thought of Franklin as containing the seeds of postmodernism -
or, to mix metaphors, if we recognize that the birth pangs of 
postmodernism exist in embryonic form in Franklin's philosophy. 
e Analyzing in this light, we can detect, in hints and guesses, how 
some of Franklin's thoughts anticipate the intellectual revolution 
two centuries later. 
Although often considered the quintessential man of the 
Enlightenment, Franklin often evidences a pessimism of the potential 
d . of knowledge and positivistic thinking. As we have already noted, 
Franklin resists positive affirmations and propositions asserted in a 
positive tone. According to Franklin, no one owns a monopoly on 
d truth because truth is often slippery. To affirm a proposition 
positively with blithe self-assurance is to belie this fact. In this regard, 
then, Franklin borders on the postmodem attitude toward truth. 
!S Specifically, Franklin, like the postmodernists, seems to deflate 
Cartesian optimism in a universal and knowable truth. In a 1759letter 
to Mary Stevenson, Franklin writes: 
And indeed all our Knowledge is so imperfect, and we are 
from a thousand Causes so perpetually subject to Mistake and 
Error, that Positiveness can scarce ever become even the most 
knowing; and Modesty in advancing any Opinion, however, 
plain and true we may suppose it, is always decent, and 
is, generally more likely to procure Assent. 53 
These thoughts reflect the temper of postmodernism-a modesty 
engendered by the awareness of the limitations of knowledge. 
We can see, then, how Franklin's awareness of these limitations 
helped pave the way for the postmodem conclusion that purely 
objective truth does not exist. The postmodern denial of objective 
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truth naturally proceeds from the Franklinian awareness of 
the limitations of knowledge. If we plotted the course of 
postmodernism, in other words, Franklin's thoughts could very 
well represent the launching point. Causality in intellectual history 
again enters the picture. Thoughts such as Franklin's were among 
the sufficient causes to propose the radical questions that molded 
postmodernism into what it is today. In this sense, then, a thread of 
continuity links Franklin and postmodernism. 
If, as I have suggested, threads of continuity in intellectual 
history interweave with other threads, then we might expect 
Franklin to share other commonalities with postmodernists. This 
expectation is fulfilled when we notice that Franklin adopts a form 
of perspectivalism in his philosophy and theology. Here, as with 
James, threads interweave in the sense that perspectivalism is 
closely related, in fact, is almost a corollary, to a skepticism of 
objective truth. Franklin exhibits a perspectivalism similar in form 
to that of James and the postmodernists when he analyzes the 
various truth claims of the theological denominations of his day. 
He first considers the theology of a sect known as the "Dunkers" 
and then elucidates an analogy incorporating the image of fog. He 
writes: 
This Modesty in a Sect [the Dunkers] is perhaps a singular 
Instance in the History of Mankind, every other Sect 
supposing itself in Possession of all Truth, and that those who 
differ are so far in the Wrong: Like a Man travelling in foggy 
Weather: Those at some Distance before him on the Road he 
sees wrapped up in the Fog, as well as those behind him, and 
also the People in the Fields on each side, but near him all 
appears clear. Tho' in truth he is as much in the Fog as any of 
them. 54 
In this analogy, every man, as a result of the fog, can see within 
a circumscribed space. Such space that man attributes as truth. 
However, the "truthness" of that parameter of vision only results 
from that man's perspective. Moreover, visualizing the image 
holistically, we can see tha~ every man is clouded in fog. Since 
the fog restricts the scope of vision, and since the fog is 
all-encompassing, all judgments depend upon perspective. In 
this respect, then, we can see how Franklin's illustration of the 
nature of theological truth is distinctly postrnodern. 
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Not surprisingly, Franklin's thought consequently develops 
the same pattern found in postmodernism. The nature of 
perspectivalism readily lends itself to the type of open conversation 
discussed earlier. Thus, perspectivalism and conversation 
interweave in both Franklinian and postmodern thought. Franklin 
appeals to open conversation and free inquiries when he sketches 
an outline of his Sect of the Free and Easy. He searches for 
commonalities among American citizens that would be conducive 
to promoting harmony and benevolence in an open society. After 
enumerating the basic tenets of all religions, he writes: 
. .. these I esteem' d the Essentials of every Religion, and being 
to be found in all Religions we had in our Country I respected 
them all, tho' with different degrees of Respect as I found 
them more or less mix' d with other Articles which without 
any Tendency to inspire, promote or confirm Morality, serv' d 
principally to divide us & make us unfriendly to one 
another.55 
Perhaps implicitly recognizing the nature of perspectivalism, 
Franklin attempts to reach beyond the metaphorical fog and unite 
American citizens in the spirit of friendliness.56 Franklin's method 
of achieving this goal is founded upon the hope shared by many 
postmodernists: a genuine conversation founded not upon rigidity 
and exclusion, but open-mindedness and receptivity. For this 
reason, Alfred Owen Aldridge writes that" . . . tolerance and 
humanitarianism were the only continuously and unchanging 
dogmas in [Franklin's] creed."57 These same qualities govern 
postmodern conversation today. 
It is possible, therefore, to detect elements of postmodernism in 
the philosophy of Franklin. Or, perhaps better put, it is possible to 
detect elements of Franklin's philosophy in postmodernism. Either 
way, the threads of continuity illustrate the continuous nature of 
intellectual history. As we have seen, in many ways, the ideas of 
Franklin fit congruously with the ideas of James, which, in turn, fit 
congruously with postmodern ideas. Moreover, the commonalities 
linking Franklin, James, and postmodernists form a vast fabric of 
interweaving threads, which crisscross between each thinker in 
elaborate, sometimes surprising ways. And as these threads 
interweave, ideas span centuries, and American intellectual history 
is made. 
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